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Abstract
Generalized language-of-thought arguments appropriate to
interacting cognitive modules permit exploration of how dis-
ease states interact with medical treatment. The interpen-
etrating feedback between treatment and response creates a
kind of idiotypic hall of mirrors generating a synergistic pat-
tern of efficacy, treatment failure, adverse reactions, and pa-
tient noncompliance which, from a Rate Distortion perspec-
tive, embodies a distorted image of externally-imposed struc-
tured psychosocial stress. For the US, accelerating spatial
and social diffusion of such stress enmeshes both dominant
and subordinate populations in a linked system which will
express itself, not only in an increasingly unhealthy society,
but in the diffusion of therapeutic failure, including, but not
limited to, drug-based treatments.
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I. Introduction
Antibiotic therapies are under siege from evolutionary
adaptation by pathogens. Malignancies routinely evolve
out from under anti-cancer drugs. Antiretroviral therapies
against human immunosuppressive virus (HIV), although of-
ten able to prolong life, ultimately fail for much the same
reason, and multiple-drug-resistant HIV, (MDR-HIV), like
MDR-tuberculosis, is an increasing threat. The role of so-
cial processes in some of these matters is well understood: for
example, public policies of ‘planned shrinkage’ in New York
City (Wallace and Wallace, 1998) created such degrees of so-
cial disintegration that many individual courses of drug treat-
ment were repeatedly interrupted, generating MDR strains of
TB whose address required an inordinately expensive program
of highly labor-intensive directly observed therapy (DOT) es-
timated to cost $40,000 per patient (Wallace and Wallace,
1997; D. Wallace, 1994).
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What is less understood is that the diffusing structured
psychosocial stress responsible for the unhealthy societies de-
scribed by Wilkinson (1996) appears able to affect other ther-
apeutic agents and agencies besides antibiotic drugs. Here we
will, in particular, outline how other drug therapies are likely
to come under siege, especially in the United States. From a
public health perspective this is of limited significance, since
salubrious living and working conditions, and egalitarian so-
cial relations, rather than effective drugs, are the principal
determinants of population health. That being said, spread-
ing decline of drug efficacy and rising rates of adverse reac-
tions and patient noncompliance would nonetheless constitute
a significant exacerbation of disease burden.
From the perspective of the economics of the pharmaceu-
tical industry, however, the avalanche of drug failure, side
effects, and noncompliance we predict for asthma, diabetes,
obesity, hypertension, coronary heart disease, hormonal can-
cers, depression and other mental disorders, is likely to prove
devastating. The extraordinary difficulty of bringing new
drugs to market will, if we are correct, soon be markedly
compounded. Indeed, recent work by Lazarou et al. (1998)
suggests that, even at present, adverse drug reactions are al-
ready the fourth commonest cause of death in the US.
Adverse drug reactions, to paraphrase Pirmohamed et al.
(2002), are typically either consistent with the known pharma-
cology of the drug, representing an augmentation of its known
effects, and are dose-dependent, or else are bizarre responses
to idiosyncratic induced hypersensitivity, with highly variable
outcomes depending on both the drug and the patient.
The essential role of stress in drug efficacy was recognized
some time ago by Downing and Rickels (1982), work rediscov-
ered recently by Haller and colleagues (e.g. Haller and Ha-
lasz, 2000; Haller, 2001). Downing and Rickels (1982) found
that the anxiolytic efficacy of chlordiazepoxide and diazepam
was markedly reduced in patients experiencing unfavorable
life events during drug treatment, compared with both pa-
tients experiencing favorable life events or no major events.
As Haller (2001) put it,
“To our knowledge, the impact of this finding [i.e.
Downing and Rickels, (1982)] was relatively small,
and animal research on the topic was not prompted
by it... [nonetheless] these and other similar find-
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ings show that drug efficacy is not constant, and
[epi]genetic factors (e.g. stress) have a strong mod-
ulator effect.”
Patient medication noncompliance, to paraphrase the con-
ventional perspective taken by Miura et al. (2001), is already
a serious factor limiting the effectiveness of medical treat-
ments. For instance, the classic study of Sackett and Haynes
(1976), found that, even under the best of circumstances, over
30 percent of patients skipped their prescribed doses regard-
less of their disease, prognosis, or symptoms.
Many such problems are related to maintaining long-term
therapy in patients with chronic disease such as hypertension.
Factors encouraging noncompliance in long-term therapy in-
clude the cost of medication, lack of written instructions, non-
participation of the patient in designing the treatment plan,
lack of patient education about disease, side effects, and in-
convenient dosing schedules. These factors may enhance the
frequency of patient noncompliance as the duration of drug
therapy is prolonged.
Langer (1999) takes a view more in concert with current
medical anthropology:
“Care providers [have socially constructed] be-
havior as compliant when it was patterned by their
expectations and noncompliant when behavior devi-
ated from their [culturally and socially conditioned]
expectations... [Their] [l]ack of awareness of cul-
tural issues increases [patient-provider] social dis-
tance, breaks down communications, and precipi-
tates misconceptions between minority patients and
their health care providers. Therefore, opportuni-
ties for patient dissatisfaction and noncompliance in-
crease...
Brock and Salinsky (1993) use the term ‘ther-
apeutic alliance’ to denote a process in which the
health care provider communicates an assessment
of the patient’s problem and coordinates a practi-
cal management plan that is conducive to patient
compliance. This assessment must consider and in-
tegrate information about all the systems in which
the person exists: biological, psychological, infor-
mal/formal social support system, and cultural...
Elevating the patient’s status within the therapeutic
alliance increases the likelihood of... participation,
that is, enhanced compliance.”
Here we will suggest that stress itself is not undifferenti-
ated, like pressure under water, but often has a complicated
grammar and syntax which can, in a sense, carve a distorted
image of that structure onto basic human physiological and
psychological structures and their responses to medical inter-
vention, including but not limited to, pharmaceuticals.
We will, quite formally, synthesize these matters at and
across physiological, psychological, and psychosocial levels
of organization, particularly considering the impact of struc-
tured stress on the therapeutic alliance.
Essential clues are to be found in observed patterns of
population-level disparity in drug efficacy, adverse reactions,
and compliance across ethnic groups, once we have discounted
contemporary pharmacogenetic ideology.
According to Burroughs et al. (2002), pharmacogenetic
research over the past few decades has uncovered significant
differences among racial and ethnic groups in the metabolism,
clinical effectiveness, and side-effect profiles of many clini-
cally important drugs, a matter which, they claim, can be at-
tributed to “...genetic factors that underlie varying responses
to medicines observed among different genetic and racial
groups”.
An unsigned editorial commentary in a recent issue of Na-
ture:genetics (vol. 29, no.3, 239, 2001) is somewhat more
guarded, but reaches a similar conclusion, focused, however,
at the individual rather than the group locus-of-control:
“Adverse drug reactions or failure to respond to
certain drugs can be influenced by polymorphisms
in genes responsible for metabolizing drugs. [While]
[t]he frequency of such polymorphisms has been
found to vary between populations of common an-
cestry... a number of studies... have shown that av-
erage differences in the genetic determinants of drug
response... [between] groups... are relatively small
and there is considerable overlap between groups.
Once all the genes that contribute to drug response
are identified, doctors will be able to prescribe drugs
based on patients’ [individual] genotypes... this is the
promise of the Human Genome Project.” (emphasis
added)
Depending on mainstream perspective, then, it is ‘genetic
polymorphisms’ at either the group or individual level which
are responsible for most of the variance in patient response to
drug therapy.
Currently one of the most discussed examples is the finding
that, while 49 percent of white male patients benefited from
an angiotensis-converting enzyme inhibitor for heart failure,
only 14 percent of African-American males did so (Exner et
al., 2001). The point of debate within the biomedical main-
stream is not whether this result is a actually attributable to
genetic polymorphism or not, but, rather, appears limited to
questions regarding the level of organization at which such
polymorphism should be investigated, i.e. the racial/ethnic
group or the individual.
The reader may have noted the scientific mystery implicit in
these results: since the distribution of polymorphisms related
to drug efficacy appears to greatly overlap between ‘racial’
subgroups precisely as the Nature:genetics editorial commen-
tary states, the three-fold difference in such efficacy between
white and African-American males cannot be entirely, or in-
deed, even significantly, explained by those polymorphisms.
What is really going on?
Here we raise a larger and far more fundamental locus-of-
control question about therapeutic efficacy, compliance, and
adverse reactions to therapy, including, but not limited to,
drugs. That locus of control is the embedding pattern of
structured psychosocial stress exemplified by figure 1, which
redisplays material from Singh-Manoux (2003). It shows, for
men and women separately, self-reported health as a function
of self-reported status rank, where 1 is high and 10 low rank,
among some 7000 male and 3400 female London-based office
staff, aged 35-55 working in 20 Civil Service departments dur-
ing the late 1990’s. Self-reported health is a highly significant
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predictor of future morbidity and mortality. The results for
both sexes are virtually indistinguishable in what is a kind of
toxicological dose-response curve, showing physiological re-
sponse against a ‘dosage’ of hierarchy that may include both
measures of highly structured stress and real availability of
resources (Link and Phelan, 2000). Note that low status staff
approach the critical ‘ED-50’ stage at which half the popula-
tion shows impact from the dosage.
Figure 1 and its generalizations have been the subject of a
long scientific debate regarding the way in which the health
of those on the lower left hand side are linked to those on the
upper right through various mechanisms. Wilkinson, (1996),
for example, describes how the rich of nations with lesser dis-
parities between rich and poor are markedly healthier than
the rich in nations – like the US – having greater disparities.
In precisely this regard, figure 2 shows the Black vs. White
diabetes death rates (per 100,000) covering the period 1979-97
for the US, and figure 3 the corresponding hypertension death
rates over the same time span. 1997 is, in both cases, the point
at the upper right. While the Black rates are elevated com-
pared to the White in both cases, the relentless increases are
highly correlated indeed, suggesting a single underlying cause
which enmeshes both dominant and subordinate populations.
Figure 4 suggests etiology. It shows the rapidly increasing
percent of total US income accounted for by the highest five
percent of earners as a function of the integral of the number
of manufacturing jobs lost since 1980. This latter is an in-
dex of permanently dispersed social, economic, and political
capital for vast sectors of the population. While US dein-
dustrialization has most profoundly affected minority urban
neighborhoods (e.g. Massey, 1990), it has also devastated
many white working-class communities (e.g. Pappas, 1989).
See Wallace et al. (1999) or Wallace and Wallace (2003) for
a more complete discussion.
The general inference is that deindustrialization and its as-
sociated phenomena have exacerbated a pathogenic social hi-
erarchy enmeshing both dominant and subordinate popula-
tions into trajectories of serious developmental disorder. Ab-
sent large-scale social, economic, and political reforms, this
process will certainly continue.
We intend to generalize this argument to the role of struc-
tured psychosocial stress in therapeutic efficacy, failure, ad-
verse reactions, and patient noncompliance.
Within the US, the particular analogs to figure 1 inevitably
involve the aftermath of a slave economy that persisted into
the middle 19th Century and has smoothly evolved into the
current, and newly-resurgent, system of American Apartheid
(e.g. Massey and Denton, 1993). The latter is inextrica-
bly convoluted with a market economy which, in the after-
math of deindustrialization and the decline of unions, gives
few rights, little stability, and sharply declining real resources
for the vast majority of its participants. In addition, delib-
erate policies of ethnic cleansing ranging from urban renewal
to planned shrinkage have left virtually all urban African-
American neighborhoods looking like Dresden after the fire-
bombing (e.g. Wallace andWallace, 1998), with the inevitable
individual and community-scale horrors consequent on such
acts.
It is little wonder that African-American males do not re-
spond well to certain classes of drugs. Given the implications
of figures 2-4, it seems unlikely such failure will be restricted
to them, however.
We will use a mathematical modeling strategy to investi-
gate more precisely how structured psychosocial stress, like
that of figure 1, might insinuate itself into physiological and
other response to medical therapy, including but not limited
to drug efficacy and adverse drug reactions.
The results of this exercise suggest that questions regard-
ing cross sectional and longitudinal structured stress at the
individual level might, in the vast majority of cases, provide
more useful information in designing and monitoring medical
interventions, including drug therapies, than individualized
genetic profiles. This conclusion is, however, modulated by
the inescapably irreducible consequences of such stress at the
population level, a matter to which we will repeatedly re-
turn, and which is profoundly implicated in our predictions
of spreading drug failure.
We begin by examining mind/body interaction as a com-
posite structure of within-individual ‘cognitive modules’ en-
meshed with an immediate ‘sociocultural network’, all embed-
ded in a larger context of structured psychosocial stress. We
thus implicitly embrace ‘comorbidity’ between chronic mental
and physical disorder, and examine therapeutic intervention
in such a structure.
This is no small matter, and leads to use of cutting-edge
methods. Indeed, further comment on our methodology is
appropriate:
Here we adapt recent advances in understanding punctu-
ated equilibrium in evolutionary process (e.g. Wallace, 2002b;
Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999) to the question of how em-
bedding structured psychosocial stress affects the interaction
of mind, body, pathology, and medical treatment. We specif-
ically seek to determine how the synergism of stress, cogni-
tive submodules, and therapeutic intervention, might be con-
strained by certain of the asymptotic limit theorems of prob-
ability.
We know that, regardless of the probability distribution of
a particular stochastic variate, the Central Limit Theorem
ensures that long sums of independent realizations of that
variate will follow a Normal distribution. Analogous con-
straints exist on the behavior of information sources – both
independent and interacting – and these are described by the
limit theorems of information theory. Imposition of phase
transition formalism from statistical physics, in the spirit of
the Large Deviations Program of applied probability, permits
concise and unified description of evolutionary and cognitive
‘learning plateaus’ which, in the evolutionary case, are inter-
preted as evolutionary punctuation (e.g. Wallace, 2002a, b).
This approach provides a ‘natural’ means of exploring punctu-
ated processes in the effects of structured stress on mind-body
interaction in the context of therapeutic intervention.
The model, as in the relation of the Central Limit The-
orem to parametric statistical inference, is almost indepen-
dent of the detailed structure of the interacting information
sources inevitably associated with cognitive process, impor-
tant as such structure may be in other contexts. This finesses
some of the profound ambiguities associated with ‘dynamic
systems theory’ and ‘deterministic chaos’ treatments in which
the existence of ‘dynamic attractors’ depends on very specific
kinds of differential equation models akin to those used to de-
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scribe ecological population dynamics, chemical processes, or
physical systems of weights-on-springs. Cognitive phenomena
are neither well-stirred Erlenmeyer flasks of reacting agents,
nor distorted mechanical clocks, and the application of nonlin-
ear dynamic systems theory to cognition will likely be found
to involve little more than hopeful metaphor. Indeed, much
of contemporary nonlinear dynamics can be subsumed within
our formalism through symbolic dynamics discretization tech-
niques (e.g. Beck and Schlogl, 1995).
In contrast, it seems actually possible to uncover the gram-
mar and syntax of structured psychosocial stress and the func-
tion of cognitive submodules, and to express their relations
in terms of empirically observed regression models relating
measurable biomarkers, behaviors, beliefs, feelings, and so on.
Our analysis will focus on the eigenstructure of those models,
constrained by the ergodic and other properties of information
sources.
Clearly our approach takes much from parametric statis-
tics, and, while idiosyncratic ‘nonparametric’ models may be
required in special cases, we may well capture the essence of
the most common relevant phenomena.
Some cognitive modules of human biology
1. Immune function Atlan and Cohen (1998) have pro-
posed an information-theoretic cognitive model of immune
function and process, a paradigm incorporating cognitive pat-
tern recognition-and-response behaviors analogous to those of
the central nervous system. This work follows in a very long
tradition of speculation on the cognitive properties of the im-
mune system (e.g. Tauber, 1998; Podolsky and Tauber, 1998;
Grossman, 1989, 1992, 1993a, b, 2000).
From the Atlan/Cohen perspective, the meaning of an anti-
gen can be reduced to the type of response the antigen gen-
erates. That is, the meaning of an antigen is functionally
defined by the response of the immune system. The mean-
ing of an antigen to the system is discernible in the type of
immune response produced, not merely whether or not the
antigen is perceived by the receptor repertoire. Because the
meaning is defined by the type of response there is indeed a
response repertoire and not only a receptor repertoire.
To account for immune interpretation Cohen (1992, 2000)
has reformulated the cognitive paradigm for the immune sys-
tem. The immune system can respond to a given antigen in
various ways, it has ‘options.’ Thus the particular response
we observe is the outcome of internal processes of weighing
and integrating information about the antigen.
In contrast to Burnet’s view of the immune response as a
simple reflex, it is seen to exercise cognition by the interpola-
tion of a level of information processing between the antigen
stimulus and the immune response. A cognitive immune sys-
tem organizes the information borne by the antigen stimulus
within a given context and creates a format suitable for in-
ternal processing; the antigen and its context are transcribed
internally into the ‘chemical language’ of the immune system.
The cognitive paradigm suggests a language metaphor to
describe immune communication by a string of chemical sig-
nals. This metaphor is apt because the human and immune
languages can be seen to manifest several similarities such as
syntax and abstraction. Syntax, for example, enhances both
linguistic and immune meaning.
Although individual words and even letters can have their
own meanings, an unconnected subject or an unconnected
predicate will tend to mean less than does the sentence gen-
erated by their connection.
The immune system creates a ‘language’ by linking two
ontogenetically different classes of molecules in a syntactical
fashion. One class of molecules are the T and B cell recep-
tors for antigens. These molecules are not inherited, but are
somatically generated in each individual. The other class of
molecules responsible for internal information processing is
encoded in the individual’s germline.
Meaning, the chosen type of immune response, is the out-
come of the concrete connection between the antigen subject
and the germline predicate signals.
The transcription of the antigens into processed peptides
embedded in a context of germline ancillary signals consti-
tutes the functional language of the immune system. Despite
the logic of clonal selection, the immune system does not re-
spond to antigens as they are, but to abstractions of antigens-
in-context.
2. Tumor control We propose that the next cognitive
submodule after the immune system is a tumor control mech-
anism which may include immune surveillance, but clearly
transcends it. Nunney (1999) has explored cancer occurrence
as a function of animal size, suggesting that in larger ani-
mals, whose lifespan grows as about the 4/10 power of their
cell count, prevention of cancer in rapidly proliferating tissues
becomes more difficult in proportion to size. Cancer control
requires the development of additional mechanisms and sys-
tems to address tumorigenesis as body size increases – a syn-
ergistic effect of cell number and organism longevity. Nunney
concludes
“This pattern may represent a real barrier to the
evolution of large, long-lived animals and predicts
that those that do evolve ... have recruited addi-
tional controls [over those of smaller animals] to pre-
vent cancer.”
In particular, different tissues may have evolved markedly
different tumor control strategies. All of these, however, are
likely to be energetically expensive, permeated with different
complex signaling strategies, and subject to a multiplicity of
reactions to signals, including those related to psychosocial
stress. Forlenza and Baum (2000) explore the effects of stress
on the full spectrum of tumor control, ranging from DNA
damage and control, to apoptosis, immune surveillance, and
mutation rate. Elsewhere (R. Wallace et al., 2003) we argue
that this elaborate tumor control strategy, at least in large
animals, must be at least as cognitive as the immune sys-
tem itself, which is one of its components: some comparison
must be made with an internal picture of a healthy cell, and a
choice made as to response: none, attempt DNA repair, trig-
ger programmed cell death, engage in full-blown immune at-
tack. This is, from the Atlan/Cohen perspective, the essence
of cognition.
3. The HPA axis The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis, the flight-or-fight system, is clearly cognitive in
the Atlan/Cohen sense. Upon recognition of a new pertur-
bation in the surrounding environment, memory and brain
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or emotional cognition evaluate and choose from several pos-
sible responses: no action needed, flight, fight, helplessness
(i.e. flight or fight needed, but not possible). Upon appro-
priate conditioning, the HPA axis is able to accelerate the
decision process, much as the immune system has a more effi-
cient response to second pathogenic challenge once the initial
infection has become encoded in immune memory. Certainly
hyperreactivity in the context of post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) is a well known example. Chronic HPA axis
activation is deeply implicated in visceral obesity leading to
diabetes and heart disease, via the leptin/cortisol diurnal cy-
cle (e.g. Bjorntorp, 2001).
4. Blood pressure regulation Rau and Elbert (2001)
review much of the literature on blood pressure regulation,
particularly the interaction between baroreceptor activation
and central nervous function. We paraphrase something of
their analysis. The essential point, of course, is that unreg-
ulated blood pressure would be quickly fatal in any animal
with a circulatory system, a matter as physiologically fun-
damental as tumor control. Much work over the years has
elucidated some of the mechanisms involved: increase in arte-
rial blood pressure stimulates the arterial baroreceptors which
in turn elicit the baroreceptor reflex, causing a reduction in
cardiac output and in peripheral resistance, returning pres-
sure to its original level. The reflex, however, is not actually
this simple: it may be inhibited through peripheral processes,
for example under conditions of high metabolic demand. In
addition, higher brain structures modulate this reflex arc, for
instance when threat is detected and fight or flight responses
are being prepared. This suggests, then, that blood pressure
control cannot be a simple reflex, but is, rather, a broad and
actively cognitive modular system which compares a set of in-
coming signals with an internal reference configuration, and
then chooses an appropriate physiological level of blood pres-
sure from a large repertory of possible levels, i.e. a cognitive
process in the Atlan/Cohen sense. The baroreceptors and the
baroreceptor reflex are, from this perspective, only one set of
a complex array of components making up a larger and more
comprehensive cognitive blood pressure regulatory module.
5. Emotion Thayer and Lane (2000) summarize the case
for what can be described as a cognitive emotional process.
Emotions, in their view, are an integrative index of individual
adjustment to changing environmental demands, an organis-
mal response to an environmental event that allows rapid mo-
bilization of multiple subsystems. Emotions are the moment-
to-moment output of a continuous sequence of behavior, orga-
nized around biologically important functions. These ‘lawful’
sequences have been termed behavioral systems by Timber-
lake (1994).
Emotions are self-regulatory responses that allow the effi-
cient coordination of the organism for goal-directed behavior.
Specific emotions imply specific eliciting stimuli, specific ac-
tion tendencies including selective attention to relevant stim-
uli, and specific reinforcers. When the system works properly,
it allows for flexible adaptation of the organism to changing
environmental demands, so that an emotional response repre-
sents a selection of an appropriate response and the inhibition
of other less appropriate responses from a more or less broad
behavioral repertoire of possible responses. Such choice, we
will show, leads directly to something closely analogous to the
Atlan and Cohen language metaphor.
Damasio (1998) concludes that emotion is the most complex
expression of homeostatic regulatory systems. The results of
emotion serve the purpose of survival even in nonminded or-
ganisms, operating along dimensions of approach or aversion,
of appetition or withdrawal. Emotions protect the subject
organism by avoiding predators or scaring them away, or by
leading the organism to food and sex. Emotions often op-
erate as a basic mechanism for making decisions without the
labors of reason, that is, without resorting to deliberated con-
siderations of facts, options, outcomes, and rules of logic. In
humans learning can pair emotion with facts which describe
the premises of a situation, the option taken relative to solv-
ing the problems inherent in a situation, and perhaps most
importantly, the outcomes of choosing a certain option, both
immediately and in the future. The pairing of emotion and
fact remains in memory in such a way that when the facts are
considered in deliberate reasoning when a similar situation is
revisited, the paired emotion or some aspect of it can be re-
activated. The recall, according to Damasio, allows emotion
to exert its pairwise qualification effect, either as a conscious
signal or as nonconscious bias, or both, In both types of ac-
tion the emotions and the machinery underlying them play
an important regulatory role in the life of the organism. This
higher order role for emotion is still related to the needs of
survival, albeit less apparently.
Thayer and Friedman (2002) argue, from a dynamic sys-
tems perspective, that failure of what they term inhibitory
processes which, among other things, direct emotional re-
sponses to environmental signals, is an important aspect of
psychological and other disorder. Sensitization and inhibi-
tion, they claim, sculpt the behavior of an organism to meet
changing environmental demands. When these inhibitory pro-
cesses are dysfunctional – choice fails – pathology appears at
numerous levels of system function, from the cellular to the
cognitive.
Thayer and Lane (2000) also take a dynamic systems per-
spective on emotion and behavioral subsystems which, in the
service of goal-directed behavior and in the context of a be-
havioral system, they see organized into coordinated assem-
blages that can be described by a small number of control
parameters, like the factors of factor analysis, revealing the
latent structure among a set of questionnaire items thereby
reducing or mapping the higher dimensional item space into a
lower dimensional factor space. In their view, emotions may
represent preferred configurations in a larger ‘state-space’ of
a possible behavioral repertoire of the organism. From their
perspective, disorders of affect represent a condition in which
the individual is unable to select the appropriate response,
or to inhibit the inappropriate response, so that the response
selection mechanism is somehow corrupted.
Gilbert (2001) suggests that a canonical form of such ‘cor-
ruption’ is the excitation of modes that, in other circum-
stances, represent normal evolutionary adaptations, a matter
to which we will return at some length below.
6. ‘Rational thought’ Although the Cartesian dichotomy
between rational thought and emotion may be increasingly
suspect, nonetheless humans, like many other animals, do in-
deed conduct individual rational cognitive decision-making as
most of us would commonly understand it. Various forms
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of dementia involve characteristic patterns of degradation in
that ability.
7. Sociocultural network Humans, however, are partic-
ularly noted for a hypersociality which inevitably enmeshes us
all in group processes of decision, i.e. collective cognitive be-
havior within a social network, tinged by an embedding shared
culture. For humans, culture is truly fundamental. Durham
(1991) argues that genes and culture are two distinct but in-
teracting systems of inheritance within human populations.
Information of both kinds has influence, actual or potential,
over behaviors, which creates a real and unambiguous sym-
metry between genes and phenotypes on the one hand, and
culture and phenotypes, on the other. Genes and culture are
best represented as two parallel lines or tracks of hereditary
influence on phenotypes.
Much of hominid evolution can be characterized as an in-
terweaving of genetic and cultural systems. Genes came to
encode for increasing hypersociality, learning, and language
skills. The most successful populations displayed increasingly
complex structures that better aided in buffering the local
environment (e.g. Bonner, 1980).
Successful human populations seem to have a core of tool
usage, sophisticated language, oral tradition, mythology, mu-
sic, magic, medicine, and religion, and decision making skills
focused on relatively small family/extended family social net-
work groupings. More complex social structures are built
on the periphery of this basic object (e.g. Richerson and
Boyd, 1995). The human species’ very identity may rest on
its unique evolved capacities for social mediation and cul-
tural transmission. These are particularly expressed through
the cognitive decision making of small groups facing changing
patterns of threat and opportunity, processes in which we are
all embedded and all participate.
Cognition as language
Atlan and Cohen (1998) argue that the essence of cognition
is comparison of a perceived external signal with an internal,
learned picture of the world, and then, upon that comparison,
the choice of one response from a much larger repertoire of
possible responses. Clearly, from this perspective, the Thayer
and Lane vision of the emotional process is cognitive. Upon
recognition of a new perturbation in the surrounding environ-
ment, emotional cognition evaluates and choose from several
possible responses: no action necessary, or one or a few suc-
cinct emotions elicited. Upon appropriate conditioning, the
emotional response is able to accelerate the decision process
as to what large-scale, general response may be needed, much
as the immune system has a more efficient response to second
pathogenic challenge once the initial infection has become en-
coded in immune memory. Similar considerations apply to
individual rational thought and to culturally-sculpted group
processes.
Following the approach of Wallace (2000, 2002a), we make
a very general model of this process.
Pattern recognition-and-response, as we characterize it,
proceeds by convoluting an incoming external sensory sig-
nal with an internal ongoing activity – the learned picture
of the world – and, at some point, triggering an appropri-
ate action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory
activity requires a response. We need not specify how the
pattern recognition system is trained, and hence we adopt a
weak model, regardless of learning paradigm, which can it-
self be more formally described by the Rate Distortion Theo-
rem. We will, fulfilling Atlan and Cohen’s (1998) criterion of
meaning-from-response, define a language’s contextual mean-
ing entirely in terms of system output.
The model, an extension of that presented in Wallace
(2000), is as follows.
A pattern of ‘sensory’ input, say an ordered sequence
y0, y1, ..., is mixed in a systematic way with internal ‘ongoing’
activity, the sequence w0, w1, ..., to create a path of compos-
ite signals x = a0, a1, ..., an, ..., where aj = f(yj , wj) for a
function f . An explicit example will be given below. This
path is then fed into a highly nonlinear ‘decision oscillator’
which generates an output h(x) that is an element of one of
two (presumably) disjoint sets B0 and B1. We take
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.
Thus we permit a graded response, supposing that if
h(x) ∈ B0
the pattern is not recognized, and if
h(x) ∈ B1
the pattern is recognized and some action bj , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
We are interested in composite paths x which trigger pat-
tern recognition-and-response exactly once. That is, given a
fixed initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0, we examine all
possible subsequent paths x beginning with a0 and leading
exactly once to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0
for all j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n let N(n) be the number of
paths of length n which begin with some particular a0 having
h(a0) ∈ B0 and lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B1. We shall
call such paths ‘meaningful’ and assume N(n) to be consid-
erably less than the number of all possible paths of length n
– pattern recognition-and-response is comparatively rare. We
further assume that the finite limit
H ≡ lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
both exists and is independent of the path x. We will – not
surprisingly – call such a cognitive process ergodic.
Note that disjoint partition of ‘state space’ may be pos-
sible according to sets of states which can be connected by
‘meaningful’ paths, leading to a ‘natural’ coset algebra of the
system, a matter of some importance we will not pursue here.
We may thus define an ergodic information sourceX associ-
ated with stochastic variates Xj having joint and conditional
probabilities P (a0, ..., an) and P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such that ap-
propriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties may be
defined which satisfy the relations (Cover and Thomas, 1991;
Ash, 1990)
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H[X] = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
=
lim
n→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1) =
lim
n→∞
H(X0, ..., Xn)
n
.
(1)
We say this information source is dual to the ergodic cog-
nitive process.
The Shannon-McMillan Theorem provides a kind of ‘law of
large numbers’ and permits definition of the Shannon uncer-
tainties in terms of cross-sectional sums of the form
H = −
∑
Pk log[Pk],
where the Pk are taken from a probability distribution, so
that
∑
Pk = 1. Again, Cover and Thomas (1991) or Ash
(1990) provide algebraic details.
It is important to recognize that different (generalized) lan-
guages will be defined by different divisions of the total uni-
verse of possible responses into various pairs of sets B0 and
B1, or by requiring more than one response inB1 along a path.
Like the use of different distortion measures in the Rate Dis-
tortion Theorem (e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991), however, it
seems obvious that the underlying dynamics will all be quali-
tatively similar. Nonetheless, dividing the full set of possible
responses into the sets B0 and B1 may itself require ‘higher
order’ cognitive decisions by another module or modules, sug-
gesting the necessity of choice within a more or less broad set
of possible languages of thought. This would directly reflect
the need to ‘shift gears’ according to the different challenges
faced by the organism. A critical problem then becomes the
choice of a normal – zero-mode – language among a very large
set of possible languages representing the ‘excited states’ ac-
cessible to the system. This is a fundamental point which we
explore below in various ways.
In sum, meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar
and syntax – have been defined entirely in terms of system
response, as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose.
We can apply this formalism to the stochastic neuron in
a neural network: A series of inputs yji , i = 1, ...m from m
nearby neurons at time j to the neuron of interest is convo-
luted with ‘weights’ wji , i = 1, ...,m, using an inner product
aj = yj ·wj ≡
m∑
i=1
yjiw
j
i
(2)
in the context of a transfer function f(yj ·wj) such that the
probability of the neuron firing and having a discrete output
zj = 1 is P (zj = 1) = f(yj ·wj).
Thus the probability that the neuron does not fire at time
j is just 1 − P . In the usual terminology the m values yji
constitute the ‘sensory activity’ and the m weights wji the
‘ongoing activity’ at time j, with aj = yj ·wj and the path
x ≡ a0, a1, ..., an, .... A more elaborate example is given in
Wallace (2002a).
A little work leads to a standard neural network model
in which the network is trained by appropriately varying w
through least squares or other error minimization feedback.
This can be shown to replicate rate distortion arguments, as
we can use the error definition to define a distortion function
which measures the difference between the training pattern
y and the network output yˆ as a function, for example, of
the inverse number of training cycles, K. As we will discuss
in another context, ‘learning plateau’ behavior emerges natu-
rally as a phase transition in the mutual information I(Y, Yˆ )
driven by the parameter K.
Thus we will eventually parametize the information source
uncertainty of the dual information source to a cognitive pat-
tern recognition-and-response with respect to one or more
variates, writing, e.g. H[K], where K ≡ (K1, ...,Ks) repre-
sents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K follow
some path in time, i.e. trace out a generalized line or surface
K(t). We will, following the argument of Wallace (2002b),
assume that the probabilities defining H, for the most part,
closely track changes inK(t), so that along a particular ‘piece’
of a path in parameter space the information source remains
as close to memoryless and ergodic as is needed for the math-
ematics to work. Between pieces we impose phase transition
characterized by a renormalization symmetry, in the sense of
Wilson (1971). See Binney, et al. (1986) for a more complete
discussion.
We will call such an information source adiabatically piece-
wise memoryless ergodic (APME). The ergodic nature of the
information sources is a generalization of the law of large num-
bers and implies that the long-time averages we will need to
calculate can, in fact, be closely approximated by averages
across the probability spaces of those sources. This is no
small matter.
The reader may have noticed parallels in our development
with Fodor’s speculations on the language of thought (e.g.
Fodor, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 1999) in which
he proposes a Chomskian linguistically complete background
natural language as the basis of mental function in humans.
We have taken a weak i.e. asymptotic, approach which does
not require linguistic completeness, but only that very long se-
ries of outputs may be characterized as the product of a dual
information source which is adiabatically, piecewise, memo-
ryless ergodic. This allows importation of phase transition
and other methods from statistical physics which provide a
natural approach to the interaction of cognitive submodules.
Interacting information sources: punctuated
crosstalk
We suppose that the behavior of a cognitive subsystem
can be represented by a sequence of states in time, the path
x ≡ x0, x1, .... Similarly, we assume an external signal of
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‘structured psychosocial stress’ can also be represented by
a path y ≡ y0, y1, .... These paths are, however, both very
highly structured and, within themselves, are serially corre-
lated and can, in fact, be represented by ‘information sources’
X and Y. We assume the cognitive process and external
stressors interact, so that these sequences of states are not in-
dependent, but are jointly serially correlated. We can, then,
define a path of sequential pairs as z ≡ (x0, y0), (x1, y1), ....
The essential content of the Joint Asymptotic Equiparti-
tion Theorem, one of the fundamental limit theorems of 20th
Century mathematics, is that the set of joint paths z can
be partitioned into a relatively small set of high probability
which is termed jointly typical, and a much larger set of van-
ishingly small probability. Further, according to the JAEPT,
the splitting criterion between high and low probability sets
of pairs is the mutual information
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
(3)
where H(X),H(Y ),H(X|Y ) and H(X,Y ) are, respec-
tively, the Shannon uncertainties of X and Y , their condi-
tional uncertainty, and their joint uncertainty. See Cover and
Thomas (1991) or Ash (1990) for mathematical details. As
stated above, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem and its vari-
ants permit expression of the various uncertainties in terms
of cross sectional sums of terms of the form −Pk log[Pk]
where the Pk are appropriate direct or conditional probabili-
ties. Similar approaches to neural process have been recently
adopted by Dimitrov and Miller (2001).
The high probability pairs of paths are, in this formulation,
all equiprobable, and if N(n) is the number of jointly typical
pairs of length n, then, according to the Shannon-McMillan
Theorem and its ‘joint’ variants,
I(X,Y ) = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
.
(4)
Generalizing the earlier language-on-a-network models of
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999), we suppose there is a ‘cou-
pling parameter’ P representing the degree of linkage between
the cognitive system of interest and the structured ‘language’
of external signals and stressors, and set K = 1/P , following
the development of those earlier studies. Then we have
I[K] = lim
n→∞
log[N(K,n)]
n
.
The essential homology between information theory and
statistical mechanics lies in the similarity of this expression
with the infinite volume limit of the free energy density. If
Z(K) is the statistical mechanics partition function derived
from the system’s Hamiltonian, then the free energy density
is determined by the relation
F [K] = lim
V→∞
log[Z(K)]
V
.
(5)
F is the free energy density, V the system volume and K =
1/T , where T is the system temperature.
We and others argue at some length (e.g. Wallace and
Wallace, 1998, 1999; Wallace, 2000; Rojdestvensky and Cot-
tam, 2000; Feynman, 1996) that this is indeed a systematic
mathematical homology which, we contend, permits impor-
tation of renormalization symmetry into information theory.
Imposition of invariance under renormalization on the mutual
information splitting criterion I(X,Y ) implies the existence
of phase transitions analogous to learning plateaus or punctu-
ated evolutionary equilibria in the relations between cognitive
mechanism and external perturbation. An extensive mathe-
matical treatment of these ideas is presented elsewhere (e.g.
Wallace, 2000, 2002a,b; Wallace et al., 2003).
Elaborate developments are possible. From a the more lim-
ited perspective of the Rate Distortion Theorem, a selective
corollary of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, we can view the
onset of a punctuated interaction between the cognitive mech-
anism and external stressors as the literal writing of distorted
image of those stressors upon cognition:
Suppose that two (adiabatically, piecewise memoryless) er-
godic information sources Y and B begin to interact, to talk
to each other, i.e. to influence each other in some way so
that it is possible, for example, to look at the output of B –
strings b – and infer something about the behavior of Y from
it – strings y. We suppose it possible to define a retranslation
from the B-language into the Y-language through a determin-
istic code book, and call Yˆ the translated information source,
as mirrored by B.
Define some distortion measure comparing paths y to paths
yˆ, d(y, yˆ) (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We invoke the Rate Dis-
tortion Theorem’s mutual information I(Y, Yˆ ), which is the
splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of
paths. Impose, now, a parametization by an inverse coupling
strengthK, and a renormalization symmetry representing the
global structure of the system coupling.
Extending the analyses, triplets of sequences, Y1, Y2, Z, for
which one in particular, here Z, is the ‘embedding context’
affecting the other two, can also be divided by a splitting
criterion into two sets, having high and low probabilities re-
spectively. The probability of a particular triplet of sequences
is then determined by the conditional probabilities
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, Z = z) = Πnj=1p(y
1
j |zj)p(y2j |zj)p(zj).
(6)
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That is, Y1 and Y2 are, in some measure, driven by their
interaction with Z.
For large n the number of triplet sequences in the high
probability set will be determined by the relation (Cover and
Thomas, 1992, p. 387)
N(n) ∝ exp[nI(Y1;Y2|Z)],
(7)
where splitting criterion is given by
I(Y1;Y2|Z) ≡
H(Z) +H(Y1|Z) +H(Y2|Z)−H(Y1, Y2, Z).
We can then examine mixed cognitive/adaptive phase tran-
sitions analogous to learning plateaus (Wallace, 2002b) in the
splitting criterion I(Y1, Y2|Z). Note that our results are al-
most exactly parallel to the Eldredge/Gould model of evo-
lutionary punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge, 1985; Gould,
2002).
We can, for the purposes of this work, extend this model to
any number of interacting information sources, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys
conditional on an external context Z in terms of a splitting
criterion defined by
I(Y1; ...;Ys|Z) = H(Z) +
s∑
j=1
H(Yj |Z)−H(Y1, ..., Ys, Z),
(8)
where the conditional Shannon uncertainties H(Yj |Z) are
determined by the appropriate direct and conditional proba-
bilities.
The generalized cognitive homunculus and its retina
Cohen (2000) argues for an ‘immunological homunculus’ as
the immune system’s perception of the body as a whole. The
particular utility of such a thing, in his view, is that sens-
ing perturbations in a bodily self-image can serve as an early
warning sign of pending necessary inflammatory response –
expressions of tumorigenesis, acute or chronic infection, para-
sitization, and the like. Thayer and Lane (2000) argue some-
thing analogous for emotional response as a quick internal
index of larger patterns of threat or opportunity.
It seems obvious that the collection of interacting cognitive
submodules we have explored above must also have a coher-
ent internal self-image of the state of the mind/body and its
social relationships. This inferred picture, at the individual
level, we term the ‘generalized cognitive homunculus’, (GCH).
We shall use the responses of the GCH to characterize phys-
iological/mental responses to both illness and to medical in-
terventions, including drugs, used to treat that illness. Illness
and treatment may come to reflect one another in a hall of
mirrors reminiscent of Jerne’s idiotypic network proposed for
the dynamics of the immune system.
Let us suppose we cannot measure either stress or cognitive
submodule function directly, but can determine the concen-
trations of hormones, neurotransmitters, certain cytokines,
and other biomarkers, or else macroscopic behaviors, beliefs,
feelings, or other responses associated with the function of
cognitive submodules according to some natural time frame
inherent to the system. This would typically be the circadian
cycle in both men and women, and the hormonal cycle in
premenopausal women. Suppose, in the absence of extraor-
dinary meaningful psychosocial stress, we measure a series of
n biomarker concentrations, behavioral characteristics, other
indices at time t which we represent as an n-dimensional vec-
tor Xt. Suppose we conduct a number of experiments, and
create a regression model so that we can, in the absence of
perturbation, write, to first order, the markers at time t + 1
in terms of that at time t using a matrix equation of the form
Xt+1 ≈ RXt,
(9)
where R is the matrix of regression coefficients, and we
have normalized to a zero vector of constant terms.
Suppose we write a GCH response to short-term perturba-
tion as
Xt+1 = (R0 + δRt+1)Xt,
where δR represents variation of the generalized cognitive
self-image about the basic state R0.
We impose a (Jordan block) diagonalization in terms of the
matrix of (generally nonorthogonal) eigenvectors Q0 of some
‘zero reference state’ R0, obtaining, for an initial condition
which is an eigenvector Yt ≡ Yk of R0,
Yt+1 = (J0 + δJt+1)Yk = λkYk + δYt+1 =
λkYk +
n∑
j=1
ajYj ,
(10)
where J0 is a (block) diagonal matrix as above, δJt+1 ≡
Q0δRt+1Q−10 , and δYt+1 has been expanded in terms of a
spectrum of the eigenvectors of R0, with
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|aj |  |λk|, |aj+1|  |aj |.
(11)
The essential point is that, provided R0 has been properly
tuned, so that this condition is true, the first few terms in
the spectrum of the plieotropic iteration of the eigenstate will
contain almost all of the essential information about the per-
turbation, i.e. most of the variance. We envision this as simi-
lar to the detection of color in the optical retina, where three
overlapping non-orthogonal ‘eigenmodes’ of response suffice
to characterize a vast array of color sensations. Here, if a
concise spectral expansion is possible, a very small number of
(typically nonorthogonal) ‘generalized cognitive eigenmodes’
permit characterization of a vast range of external perturba-
tions, and rate distortion constraints become very manageable
indeed. Thus GCH responses – the spectrum of excited eigen-
modes of R0, provided it is properly tuned – can be a very
accurate and precise gauge of environmental perturbation.
The choice of zero reference state R0, i.e. the ‘base state’
from which perturbations are measured, is, we claim, a highly
nontrivial task, necessitating a specialized apparatus.
This is no small matter. According to current theory, the
adapted human mind functions through the action and inter-
action of distinct mental modules which evolved fairly rapidly
to help address special problems of environmental and so-
cial selection pressure faced by our Pleistocene ancestors (e.g.
Barkow et al., 1992). Here we have postulated the neces-
sity of other physiological and social cognitive modules. As
is well known in computer engineering, calculation by spe-
cialized submodules – e.g. numeric processor chips – can be
a far more efficient means of solving particular well-defined
classes of problems than direct computation by a generalized
system. We suggest, then, that our generalized cognition has
evolved specialized submodules to speed the address of certain
commonly recurring challenges. Nunney (1999) has argued
that, as a power law of cell count, specialized subsystems are
increasingly required to recognize and redress tumorigenesis,
mechanisms ranging from molecular error-correcting codes, to
programmed cell death, and finally full-blown immune attack.
We argue that identification of the designated normal state
of the GCH – generalized cognition’s self-image of the body
and its social relationships – is difficult, requiring a dedi-
cated cognitive submodule within overall generalized cogni-
tion. This is essentially because, for the vast majority of
information systems, unlike mechanical systems, there are no
restoring springs whose low energy state automatically iden-
tifies equilibrium: relatively speaking, all states of the GCH
are ‘high energy’ states. That is, active comparison must be
made of the state of the GCH with some stored internal ref-
erence picture, and a decision made about whether to reset to
zero, which is a cognitive process. We further speculate that
the complexity of such a submodule must also follow some-
thing like Nunney’s power law with animal size, as the overall
generalized cognition and its image of the self, become in-
creasingly complicated with rising number of cells and levels
of linked cognition.
Failure of that cognitive submodule can result in identifi-
cation of an excited state of the GCH as normal, triggering
the collective patterns of systemic activation which, following
the argument of Wallace (2003g), constitute certain comor-
bid mental and chronic physical disorders. This would result
in a relatively small number of characteristic eigenforms of
comorbidity, which would typically become more mixed with
increasing disorder.
In sum, since such ‘zero mode identification’ (ZMI) is a
(presumed) cognitive submodule of overall generalized cogni-
tion, it involves convoluting incoming ‘sensory’ with ‘ongoing’
internal memory data in choosing the zero state, i.e. defining
R0. The dual information source defined by this cognitive
process can then interact in a punctuated manner with ‘ex-
ternal information sources’ according to the Rate Distortion
and related arguments above. From a RDT perspective, then,
those external information sources literally write a distorted
image of themselves onto the ZMI, often in a punctuated man-
ner: (relatively) sudden onset of a developmental trajectory
to comorbid mental disorders and chronic physical disease.
Different systems of external signals – including but not
limited to structured psychosocial stress – will, presumably,
write different characteristic images of themselves onto the
ZMI cognitive submodule, i.e. trigger different patterns of
comorbid mental/physical disorder.
A brief reformulation in abstract terms may be of interest.
Recall that the essential characteristic of cognition in our for-
malism involves a function h which maps a (convolutional)
path x = a0, a1, ..., an, ... onto a member of one of two dis-
joint sets, B0 or B1. Thus respectively, either (1) h(x) ∈ B0,
implying no action taken, or (2), h(x) ∈ B1, and some par-
ticular response is chosen from a large repertoire of possible
responses. We discussed briefly the problem of defining these
two disjoint sets, and suggested that some ‘higher order cog-
nitive module’ might be needed to identify what constituted
B0, the set of ‘normal’ states. Again, this is because there
is no low energy mode for information systems: virtually all
states are more or less high energy states, and there is no
way to identify a ground state using the physicist’s favorite
variational or other minimization arguments on energy.
Suppose that higher order cognitive module, which we now
recognize as a kind of Zero Mode Identification, interacts with
an embedding language of structured psychosocial stress (or
other systemic perturbation) and, instantiating a Rate Distor-
tion image of that embedding stress, begins to include one or
more members of the set B1 into the set B0. Recurrent ‘hits’
on that aberrant state would be experienced as episodes of
highly structured comorbid mind/body pathology.
Empirical tests of this hypothesis, however, quickly lead
again into real-world regression models involving the interre-
lations of measurable biomarkers, beliefs, behaviors, feelings,
and so on, requiring formalism much like that used above.
The GCH can, then, be viewed as a generic heuristic device
typifying such regression approaches.
Therapeutic efficacy, failure, and adverse reactions
To reiterate, if X represents the information source dual to
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‘zero mode identification’ in generalized cognition, and if Z is
the information source characterizing structured psychosocial
stress, which constitutes an embedding context, the mutual
information between them
I(X;Z) = H(X)−H(X|Z)
(12)
serves as a splitting criterion for pairs of linked paths of
states.
We suppose it possible to parametize the coupling between
these interacting information sources by some inverse coupling
parameter, K, writing
I(X;Z) = I[K],
(13)
with structured psychosocial stress as the embedding con-
text.
Invocation of the mathematical homology between equa-
tions (4) and (5) permits imposition of renormalization for-
malism (Wallace, 2000; Wallace et al., 2003a) resulting in
punctuated phase transition depending on K.
Socioculturally constructed and structured psychosocial
stress, in this model having both (generalized) grammar and
syntax, can be viewed as entraining the function of zero mode
identification when the coupling with stress exceeds a thresh-
old. More than one threshold appears likely, accounting in
a sense for the typically staged nature of environmentally
caused disorders. These should result in a synergistic – i.e. co-
morbidly excited – mixed affective, rationally cognitive, psy-
chosocial, and inflammatory or other physical excited state of
otherwise normal response, and represent the effect of stress
on the linked decision processes of various cognitive functions,
in particular through the identification of a false ‘zero mode’
of the GCH. This is a collective, but highly systematic, ‘tun-
ing failure’ which, in the Rate Distortion sense, represents a
literal image of the structure of imposed psychosocial stress
written upon the ability of the GCH to characterize a nor-
mal condition of excitation, causing a mixed excited state of
chronically comorbid mental and physical disorder.
In this model different eigenmodes Yk of the GCH regres-
sion model characterized by the matrix R0 can be taken to
represent the ‘shifting-of-gears’ between different ‘languages’
defining the sets B0 and B1. That is, different eigenmodes of
the GCH would correspond to different required (and possibly
mixed) characteristic systemic responses.
If there is a state (or set of states) Y1 such that R0Y1 = Y1,
then the ‘unitary kernel’ Y1 corresponds to the condition ‘no
response required’, i.e. the set B0.
Suppose pathology becomes manifest, i.e.
R0 → R0 + δR ≡ Rˆ0,
so that some chronic excited state becomes the new ‘unitary
kernel’, and
Y1 → Yˆ1 6= Y1
Rˆ0Yˆ1 = Yˆ1.
This could represent, for example, chronic inflammation,
autoimmune response, persistent depression/anxiety or HPA
axis activation/burnout, and so on.
We wish to induce a sequence of therapeutic counterper-
turbations δTk according to the pattern
[Rˆ0 + δT1]Yˆ1 = Y 1,
Rˆ1 ≡ Rˆ0 + δT1,
[Rˆ1 + δT2]Y 1 = Y 2
...
(14)
so that, in some sense,
Y j → Y1.
(15)
That is, the mind/body system, as monitored by the GCH,
is driven to its original condition.
We may or may not have Rˆ0 → R0. That is, actual cure
may not be possible, in which case palliation or control is the
therapeutic aim.
The essential point is that the pathological state repre-
sented by Rˆ0 and the sequence of therapeutic interventions
δTk, k = 1, 2, ... are interactive and reflective, depending on
the regression of the set of vectors Y j to the desired state Y1,
much in the same spirit as Jerne’s immunological idiotypic
hall of mirrors.
The therapeutic problem revolves around minimizing the
difference between Y k and Y1 over the course of treat-
ment: that difference represents the inextricable convolution
of ‘treatment failure’ with ‘adverse reactions’ to the course
of treatment itself, and ‘failure of compliance’ attributed
through social construction by provider to patient, i.e. failure
of the therapeutic alliance.
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It should be obvious that the treatment sequence δTk rep-
resents a cognitive path of interventions which has, in turn,
a dual information source in the sense we have previously
invoked.
Treatment may, then, interact in the usual Rate Distor-
tion manner with patterns of structured psychosocial stress
which are, themselves, signals from an embedding informa-
tion source. Thus treatment failure, adverse reactions, and
patient noncompliance will, of necessity, embody a distorted
image of structured psychosocial stress.
In sum, characteristic patterns of treatment failure, adverse
reactions, and patient noncompliance reflecting collapse of the
therapeutic alliance, will occur in virtually all therapeutic in-
terventions according to the manner in which structured psy-
chosocial stress is expressed as an image within the treatment
process. This would most likely occur in a highly punctu-
ated manner, depending in a quantitative way on the degree
of coupling of the three-fold system of affected individual,
patient/provider interaction, and treatment mode, with that
stress.
Given that the principal environment of humans is defined
by interaction with other humans and with socioeconomic in-
stitutions, these are likely to be very strong effects indeed.
We provide a non-pharmaceutical case history.
Malaria and the Fulani: non-pharmaceutical medical
interventions and structured psychosocial stress
Modiano et al. (1996, 1998, 2001a, b) conducted com-
parative surveys on three roughly co-resident West African
ethnic groups exposed to the same strains of malaria. The
Fulani, Mossi, and Rimaibe live in the same conditions of hy-
perendemic transmission in a Sudan savanna area northeast
of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The Mossi and Rimaibe are
Sudanese Negroid populations with a long tradition of seden-
tary farming, while the Fulani are nomadic pastoralists, partly
settled and characterized by non-Negroid features of possible
Caucasoid origin.
Parasitological, clinical, and immunological investigations
showed consistent interethnic differences in P. Falciparum in-
fection rates, malaria morbidity, and prevalence and levels of
antibodies to various P. Falciparum antigens. The data point
to a remarkably similar response to malaria in the Mossi and
Rimaibe, while the Fulani are clearly less parasitized, less
affected by the disease, and more responsive to all antigens
tested. No difference in the use of malaria protective mea-
sures was demonstrated that could account for these find-
ings. Known genetic factors of resistance to malaria showed
markedly lower frequencies in the Fulani (Modiano et al,
2001a, b). The differences in the immune response were not
explained by the entomological observations, which indicated
substantially uniform exposure to infective bites.
In their first study, Modiano et al. (1996) concluded that
sociocultural factors are not involved in this disparity, and
that the available data support the existence of unknown ge-
netic factors, possibly related to humoral immune responses,
determining interethnic differences in the susceptibility to
malaria.
In spite of later finding the Fulani in their study region
have significantly reduced frequencies of the classic malaria-
resistance genes compared to the other ethnic groups, Modi-
ano et al. (2001a, b) again concluded that their evidence sup-
ports the existence in the Fulani of unknown genetic factor(s)
of resistance to malaria.
This vision of strict genetic causality carries consequences,
seriously constraining interpretation of the efficacy of inter-
ventions. Modiano et al. (1998) report results of an experi-
ment in their Burkina Faso study zone involving the distribu-
tion of permethrin-impregnated curtains (PIC) to the three
co-resident populations, with markedly different results:
“ The PIC were distributed in June 1996 and
their impact on malaria infection was evaluated in
[the three] groups whose baseline levels of immunity
to malaria differed because of their age and ethnic
group. Age- and ethnic-dependent efficacy of the
PIC was observed. Among Mossi and Rimaibe, the
impact (parasite rate reduction after PIC installa-
tion with respect to the pre-intervention surveys)
was 18.8 % and 18.5 %, respectively. A more than
two-fold general impact (42.8 %) was recorded in the
Fulani. The impact of the intervention on infection
rates appears positively correlated with the levels of
anti-malaria immunity...”
Modiano et al. (1998) conclude from this experiment that
the expected complementary role of a hypothetical vaccine is
presaged by these results, which also, in their view, emphasize
the importance of the genetic background of the population in
the evaluation and application of malaria control strategies.
While we fully agree with the importance of their results
for a hypothetical vaccine, much in the spirit of Lewontin
(2000), we beg to differ with the ad hoc presumptions of ge-
netic causality, which paper over alternatives involving envi-
ronment and development consistent with these observations.
Recently a medical anthropologist, Andrew Gordon (2000),
published a detailed study of Fulani cultural identity and ill-
ness:
“Cultural identity – who the Fulani think they
are – informs thinking on illnesses they suffer. Con-
versely, illness, so very prevalent in sub-Saharan
Africa, provides Fulani with a consistent reminder of
their distinctive condition... How they approach be-
ing ill also tells Fulani about themselves. The man-
ner in which Fulani think they are sick expresses
their sense of difference from other ethnic groups.
Schemas of [individual] illness and of collective iden-
tity draw deeply from the same well and web of
thoughts... As individuals disclose or conceal illness,
as they discuss illness and the problem of others,
they reflect standards of Fulani life – being strong of
character not necessarily of body, being disciplined,
rigorously Moslem, and leaders among lessors... to
be in step with others and with cultural norms is to
have pride in the self and the foundations of Fulani
life.”
The Fulani carried the Islamic invasion of Africa into the
sub-Sahara, enslaving and deculturing a number of ethnic
groups, and replacing the native languages with their own.
This is much the way African Americans were enslaved, decul-
tured, and taught English.
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As Gordon puts it,
“ ‘True Fulani’ see themselves as distinguished
by their aristocratic descent, religious commitments,
and personal qualities that clearly differ from low-
land cultivators. Those in the lowland are, histori-
cally, Fulani subjects who came to act like and speak
Fulani, but they are thought to be without the right
genealogical descent. The separation between pas-
toralists and agriculturists repeats itself in settle-
ments across Africa. The terms vary from place to
place in Guinea, the terms are Fulbhe for the no-
bles and the agriculturalist Bhalebhe or Maatyub-
hee; in Burkina Faso, Fulbhe and the agricultural Ri-
maybhe; and in Nigeria, the Red Fulani and the agri-
cultural Black Fulani... The schemas for the Fulani
body describe the differences between them and oth-
ers. These are differences that justify pride in being
Fulani and not Bhalebhe, Maatyubhe, Rimaybhe, or
Black Fulani. In Guinea, the word ‘Bhalebhe’ means
‘the black one’. The term ‘Bhalebhe’ carries the
same meaning as ‘Negro’ did for Africans brought
to North America. It effaces any tribal identity...
The control a Fulani exercises over the body is
an essential feature of ‘the Fulani way.’ Being out of
control is shameful and not at all Fulani-like... To
act without restraint is to be what is traditionally
thought of as Bhalebhe...
Being afflicted with malaria – and handling it
well – is a significant proof of ethnicity. How Fulani
handle malaria may be telling. What they lack in
physical resistance to disease they make up in per-
sistence. Though sickly, Fulani men only reluctantly
give into malaria and forgo work. To give into phys-
ical discomfort is not dimo. When malaria is severe
for a man he is likely not to succumb to bed, but
instead to sit outside of his home socializing.”
The contrasting Occam’s Razor hypothesis to genetic de-
terminism, then, is that the observed significant differ-
ence in both malarial parasitization and the efficacy of
non-pharmaceutical intervention between the historically-
dominant Fulani and co-resident historically-subordinate eth-
nic groups in the Ouagadougou region of Burkina Faso is
largely accounted for by longitudinal and cross-sectional fac-
tors of structured psychosocial stress, synergistically inter-
secting with medical intervention, particularly in view of the
lower frequencies of classic malaria-resistance genes found in
the Fulani.
It is not that the Fulani aren’t parasitized, or that the
‘Fulani way’ prevents disease, but that the population-level
burdens of environment are modulated by historical develop-
ment, and these are profoundly different for former masters
and former slaves.
Conclusion: The coming plagues of drug failure,
noncompliance, and adverse reactions in the US
Structured psychosocial stress can, from our develop-
ment, write an image of itself onto the success or failure of
individual-level therapeutic intervention, drug-related or not.
The punctuated nature of individual-level response to the cou-
pling with structured stress should, when averaged across a
population, reflect itself in a nonlinear ‘dose-response’ relation
between environmental indices of stress and indices of physio-
logical impact, much as in figure 1. Apartheid systems, which
structure stress in ‘Western’ societies, following the models
of Fanon (1966), Memmi, (1967, 1969), or Wilkinson (1996),
are generally seen as frozen, Manichean, structures entangling
dominant and subordinate populations in a synergistically de-
humanizing pathogenic relationship adversely affecting both,
although the powerful are, as always, relatively healthier than
those they dominate.
Within the United States, however, the apartheid system is
changing in such a way as to enmesh increasingly larger pop-
ulations in its outfalls. Our own studies show how the post
WW-II ‘hollowing out’ of major US urban centers through
contagious urban decay and other forms of policy-driven ‘ur-
ban desertification’ has pumped social disintegration – carry-
ing with it both contagious disease and behavioral pathology
– into the commuting field surrounding central cities. These
phenomena, in turn, have likewise diffused down along the US
urban hierarchy itself, from larger to smaller metropolitan re-
gions (e.g. D. Wallace and R. Wallace, 1998; R. Wallace and
D. Wallace, 1997; D. Wallace, 2001). R. Wallace et al. (1997)
explicitly demonstrate, for eight large US urban centers, how
spreading social disintegration entrained AIDS, tuberculosis,
and violent crime into surrounding suburban counties, the
most ‘hollowed out’ central cities being the most pathogenic.
At present, chronic disease epidemics of asthma, obesity,
and diabetes, are spreading across the US, even marching up
the social hierarchy. It is our contention that these represent
the enmeshment of more and more subpopulations into rela-
tions of pathogenic social hierarchy like figure 1 (e.g. Wallace
et al., 2003c, d).
Figures 2, 3, and 4 display data related to that argument.
We predict that, not only will chronic developmental disor-
ders continue to diffuse socially and geographically, but fail-
ures of drug efficacy and patient compliance, and adverse drug
reactions, which in a literal sense mirror the same enmeshing
patterns of structured psychosocial stress creating the dis-
orders, will likewise diffuse between and within both social
subgroups and geographic regions in a similar manner. Cur-
rent ideologies of genetic determinism however, have created
significant impediments to empirical studies of this hypothe-
sis. These ideological constraints on science may, in the long
run, prove very expensive indeed to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. The example of Lysenkoism in the agriculture of the
Soviet Union may well be mirrored by the effects of ideological
geneticism in Western medicine.
In sum, slavery, racism, apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and
their collective aftermath, in concert with draconian economic
inequality compounded by deindustrialization in the after-
math of the Cold War, form the context for patterns of both
disease onset and progression, and medical treatment efficacy
affecting ethnic minorities in the United States and other
subject populations elsewhere in the world. This is a con-
text which is not containable within those populations, but
enmeshes dominant subgroups as well (e.g. Memmi, 1967,
1969), as exemplified by figures 2-4.
The result of Exner et al. (2001) regarding a more than
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three-fold difference in heart failure drug efficacy between
white and African-American males in the US does not need
invocation of genetic differences for its explanation. Follow-
ing Lewontin’s (2000) lead, we invoke instead the triple he-
lix of genes, environment and development, in both disease
and in response to, and compliance with, medical interven-
tion against disease. Given that genetic differences between
chimpanzees are generally far greater than genetic differences
between humans, the Occam’s Razor explanation for differ-
ences in response to medical intervention would seem to lie
primarily in matters of environment and development.
Independent of the mathematical modeling exercise which
has led us to this conclusion – a conclusion others have reached
without recourse to mathematics, (e.g. Braun, 2002) – this
is an empirically testable hypothesis. The most direct test
would be the reevaluation of existing drug trial data from the
geographic perspective of ‘neighborhood effects’, since, within
the US, as a result of American Apartheid, ‘race is place’.
While most drug trials are stratified by the usual population
divisions of age, sex, race/ethnicity, income/education, and
so on, they are seldom if ever examined from a formally geo-
graphic perspective. Detection of neighborhood effects in the
spectrum of drug efficacy, compliance, and adverse reactions,
would be a considerable advance. Changes in the pattern of
such neighborhood effects over time, a likely consequence of
diffusing social disintegration in the US, would serve to mon-
itor the sociogeographic spread of drug failure and decay of
the therapeutic alliance. This is likely to follow the classic
mode of hierarchical hopscotch from major metropolitan re-
gions like New York and Los Angeles, to smaller ones, then
from central city to suburbs, and finally along social networks
(e.g. Wallace and Wallace, 1997).
A second, and related line of work, would see development
of a short preclinical interview instrument exploring (1) pat-
terns of cross-sectional psychosocial stress and (2) geographic
history of residence, and testing whether such an instrument
would account for significant variance in drug efficacy, com-
pliance, and adverse reactions. While this would certainly not
substitute for programs of reform to ameliorate diffusing pat-
terns of pathogenic social hierarchy and social disintegration,
it might nonetheless prove of some individual-level value in
adjusting drug regimens.
A third extension would involve expansion of this analysis
to medical intervention beyond simple drug treatments, for
example surgical outcomes and the results of psychosocial in-
terventions. These too should show neighborhood effects indi-
cating spatially and socially diffusing structured psychosocial
stress according to the classic pattern.
A simple interview protocol would likely account for at least
as much variance in prediction of treatment efficacy, compli-
ance, and adverse reactions as more expensive and difficult
genetic testing. It is even (remotely) possible that the two
techniques could be used in parallel to provide a reasonably
full characterization of the version of Lewontin’s ‘triple helix’
which defines therapeutic response, a significant step toward
a truly biological medicine far more in concert with the re-
alities of human hypersociality than current simplistic and
ideologically driven genetic determinism.
On a more somber note, however, while some individual-
level tuning of conventional medical treatment does seem
possible, it is painfully obvious that no medical system can
ameliorate significant population-level health disparities in
the absence of aggressive affirmative action to redress both
the persisting burdens of history and current policies driving
pathogenic hierarchy and social disintegration. This being
said, it seems obvious that the economic well-being of the
drug industry, if not precisely the health of the populations
it services, will depend on a fuller understanding of the socio-
geographic diffusion of drug failure, compliance failure, and
adverse reactions. Pharmacogenetic theories of race consti-
tute a significant barrier to such understanding.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Redisplay of data from Singh-Manoux et al.
(2003). Sex-specific dose-response curves of age-adjusted
prevalence of self-reported ill-health vs. self-reported status
rank, Whitehall II cohort, 1997 and 1999. 1 is high and 10
is low status. The curves for male and female are virtually
identical, and the upper point is very near the ‘EC-50’ level in
this population i.e. the ‘effective concentration’ at which fifty
percent of subjects show physiological response. Self-reported
health is a highly significant predictor of later morbidity and
mortality.
Figure 2. US Black vs. White diabetes death rates (per
100,000), 1979-97. While the Black rates are uniformly higher
than the White, the coupling between them is very strong in-
deed, suggesting that, in the words of one researcher, “concen-
tration is not containment” for chronic as well as for infectious
diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis.
Figure 3. Same as figure 2 for US hypertension death
rates.
Figure 4. Percent of total US income accounted for by the
highest five percent of the population vs. integral of manufac-
turing job loss since 1980. Manufacturing job loss represents
the permanent, cumulative, dispersal of social, political, and
economic capital for large sectors of the US population.
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